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APPELLATE REVIEW OF FEDERAL YOUTH
CORRECTIONS ACT SENTENCES IN THE AFTERMATH
OF DORSZYNSKI v. UNITED STATES

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the United States enters its third century, perhaps no problem concerns
its citizens more than the steady increase in

crime, particularly youthful

crime. Such concern is not, however, new to the 1970s. More than twenty-five
years ago Congress enacted the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA) in an
attempt to meet the problem of crime "at its focal point, . . . before the traits
of the habitual criminal are allowed to develop, .
. . by permitting the
substitution of correctional rehabilitation for retributive punishment . ...
I
Although FYCA has not been the panacea envisioned by Congress, it has
permitted federal district court judges to impose less stringent sentences than
3
those mandated by the particular statute.
While the district court may or may not use FYCA in sentencing, 4 its
5
sentence, if within statutory limits, generally may not be reviewed. The

Supreme Court has recognized, however, the duty of the appellate court to
scrutinize the "judicial process" utilized by the district court in imposing
sentence. 6 Many courts have employed this rationale and have vacated

sentences, finding that sentencing discretion was abused or not exercised at

1. 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq. (1970). The Act was subsequently amended to include residents of
the District of Columbia. Id. § 5024.
2. H.R. Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., in U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 3983 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as House Report].
3. See notes 15-26 infra and accompanying text.
4. The Act may be disregarded, in sentencing youthful offenders, only if the trial court has
made a specific finding of no benefit. See notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text. When a
defendant is between the ages of 22 and 26, this requirement does not apply. Dorszynsk v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1974); Ross v. United States, 531 F.2d 839, 840 (7th Cir.
1976); Stead v. United States, 531 F.2d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 522
F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Gamboa-Cano, 510 F.2d 598 (5th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Chandler v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 658, 660 (D.N.J. 1975). But see
United States v. Torun, No. 76-1055 (2d Cir., June 14, 1976).
5. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); United States v. Crowe, 516 F.2d 824, 825
(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United
States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1974); see Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d
139, 143 (8th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cir. 1971).
This enormous sentencing freedom is an anomaly within the American judicial system. The ABA
has noted that "in no other area of our law does one man exercise such unrestricted power." ABA
Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences,
Introduction, I & 2 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA Draft].
6. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974), quoting with approval the Fifth
Circuit decision in United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1974).
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all; that the sentence was imposed mechanically,8 or, in FYCA situations,
that an express finding of no benefit was not made before adult sentence was
imposed. 9
In 1974, in Dorszynski v. United States,' ° the Supreme Court, while
agreeing that an express no benefit finding was required under the Act,"
affirmed again the virtually unfettered discretion of the district courts in
sentencing. 12 Although Dorszynski has restricted appellate review of FYCA
4
sentences,1 3 appellate courts continue to review and vacate such sentences.'
7. United States v. Riley, 481 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d
722 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8. United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam), United States
v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. Brooks v. United States, 497 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated sub nom. United States v.
Hopkins, 418 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. Toy, 482 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States
v. Forrest, 482 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Phillips, 479 F.2d 1200
(D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Reed, 476 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States
v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973); United States v. Ward, 454 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (per curiam).
10. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
11. Id. at 441.
12. Id. at 431. One commentator believes that judicial resistance to appellate review of
criminal sentences can be psychologically explained. In his view, the exercise of sentencing
discretion contributes significantly to the judge's "self-identity and occupational satisfaction."
Robin, Judicial Resistance to Sentencing Accountability, 21 Cr. & Delinq. 201, 202 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Robin]. Such resistance to accountability is merely symptomatic of human
behavior, that is, an attempt to avoid sanctions and sanctioning opportunities. Id. at 204-05.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to place no benefit
finding in judgment order not grounds for appellate review); United States v. Allen, 5 10 F. 2d 651
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (failure to state reasons for sentencing as adult, after express no benefit finding
made, not grounds for appellate review).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Holder, No. 75-1712 (4th Cir., June 28, 1976); United States v.
Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reliance upon inaccurate information in sentencing);
United States v. Neal, 527 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1975) (failure to make express no benefit finding);
United States v. Ortiz, 513 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 843 (1975)
(inconsistent treatment of offender in sentencing); United States v. Bailey, 509 F.2d 881 (4th Cir.
1975) (failure to make express finding of no benefit); United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (refusal to utilize Act because defendant exercised
constitutional right against self-incrimination); Belgarde v. United States, 503 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (failure to make express no benefit finding); United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985
(4th Cir. 1974) (unconstitutional standard employed in sentencing). But see United States v. Scruggs,
No. 76-1132 (8th Cir., July 13, 1976). In urging that thelong-standing rule against appellate review of
criminal sentences be modified, the ABA recognized that review is in fact available now. Many
appellate courts, dissatisfied with what they believe to be an excessive sentence, seize upon technical
errors to review and remand for a new trial. ABA Draft, supra note 5, at 3. The ABA believes that
overt appellate review of the sentence itself (as distinguished from the judicial process employed in
arriving at the sentence) would focus the issue squarely upon the severity of the sentence, avoiding a
retrial where only the sentence is found to be defective. Id.
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This Note will examine appellate review of FYCA sentences before and after
the watershed decision of Dorszynski, analyzing the various techniques employed by appellate courts to scrutinize the district court's exercise of its
greatest power.

II.

FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT

The purpose of FYCA was to provide the federal courts with an alternative
means of sentencing youths between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two by
emphasizing rehabilitation rather than punishment. 15 The Act created a
Youth Correction Division within the Board of Parole' 6 empowered to
provide for youthful offenders committed to it a "system of analysis, treatment, and release that will cure rather than accentuate the anti-social
tendencies that have led to the commission of crime.' 7 Encouraged by the
success of a similar English program,' 8 Congress believed that this new
sentencing device would drastically decrease youthful crime. 1 9
Under FYCA, the sentencing judge may choose among four alternative
sentencing procedures. If the court believes that the youth offender needs no
commitment, it may suspend the sentence and place the youth on probation. 2 0
The second alternative permits the court to sentence the youth to the custody
of the Attorney General, in lieu of imprisonment under other statutory
provisions, 2' with release required within six years of conviction.2 2 The third
alternative permits the court, if it finds that the youth offender will not benefit
from treatment under the Act, to sentence the offender to the custody of the
Attorney General 23 for a term which may exceed six years but may not exceed
the maximum period authorized by statute for the crime. 24 Finally, a court
may, if it finds that the offender will derive no benefit from FYCA sentencing, sentence the youth "under any other applicable penalty provision. '25 In
effect, the last alternative permits the district court to ignore the preferential
sentencing procedure established by Congress and sentence the youth offender
as an adult. In such cases, the trial judge may properly consider deterrence
and punishment in meting out sentence, as he has found that rehabilitation is
unlikely. 26
15.
16.

House Report, supra note 2, at 3983.
18 U.S.C. § 5005 (1970). The Division functions under the authority of tile Attorney

General, id., and in conjunction with the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Id. § 5007.
17. House Report, supra note 2, at 3983.
18. The Borstal program, initiated in Great Britain in the late nineteenth century, served as
the model and hope for FYCA. For a review of the major features of the English system, see id.
at 3987-89.
19. Id. at 3983.
20.

18 U.S.C. § 5010(a).

21.
22.

Id. § 5010(b).
Id. § 5017(c).

23.

Id.

24.
25.
26.

Id. § 5017(d).
Id. § 5010(d).
See United States v. Butler, 481 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1973), wherein the appellate court

§ 5010(c).
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II. APPELLATE REVIEW OF FYCA SENTENCES BEFORE Dorsynski
While FYCA created an alternative method of sentencing, it did not
overrule the long-standing federal rule precluding appellate review of sentences. Prior to 1891, federal courts of appeal were empowered to review and
modify excessive sentences. 27 In the reorganization of the federal appellate
system, the specific language allowing such review was deleted. 28 As a
consequence of this omission, some early federal cases after 1891 concluded
that appellate power to review and modify sentences had been implicitly
repealed. 29 This view, adopted by the Supreme Court, 30 is still
in effect,
33
31
Congress, 32 and the ABA.
despite criticism from the bench,
Although this broad restriction against review has been vigorously applied,
appellate courts may properly examine the judicial process involved in
imposing sentence to ensure that no irregularity has occurred which would
refused to vacate an adult sentence imposed after the district court found the defendant would not
benefit from treatment under the Act. The trial court listed as its reasons for the sentence the
defendant's lack of remorse; the brutal crime involved (murder); and the violence in defendant's
life, which continued even after his arrest (he struck a guard and escaped from jail). Id. at
536-37. These findings supported the adult sentence, precluding any appellate review. Id. at 537.
See also United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (Ist Cir. 1974).
27. "[I]n case of an affirmance of the judgment of the district court, the circuit court shall
proceed to pronounce final sentence and to award execution thereon.
Act of March 3, 1879,
ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354.
28. The present law omits this express language. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970).
29. Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir. 1930); Freeman v. United States, 243
F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919); Jackson v. United States, 102 F.
473, 487 (9th Cir. 1900).
30. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S 386,
393 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
31. "To review the exercise of judicial discretion in the sentencing process is not that difficult
a task-the appellate process involves similar appraisals in many areas of the law. I suggest the
main difficulty in reviewing lawful discretion on appeal comes not in measuring the exercised
judgment against the marked boundaries of the field, but in the all too human predilection of
judges to routinely 'rubber stamp' the questioned discretion of a district judge without making a
qualitative review of the actual decision. It is as erroneous to substitute conclusory agreement as
it is to voice opinionated disagreement." United States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897, 903-04 (8th Cir.
1974) (Lay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1975). One commentator believes that
appellate justices would tend toward greater moderation in sentencing, while the public would
demand stiffer sentences for the lawbreakers. In essence, the trial court would be placed in the
position of justifying its sentencing discretion to the public at large, the community which it
serves, and its peers, the appellate court justices. This would be "an enormous role reversal to a
group accustomed to its own style of authoritarianism," and could explain its continued resistance
to review. Robin, supra note 12, at 208.
32. See generally Tydings, Ensuring Rational Sentences-The Case for Appellate Review, 53
J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 68 (1969). For a listing of the various bills introduced in Congress to permit
appellate review, see Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 St. Louis U.L.J.
221, 229 n.62, 230 nn.63-67 (1972).
33. "As a matter of principle, the Advisory Committee is convinced that review of the
sentence should be available in every case in which review of a trial leading to conviction would
be available." ABA Draft, supra note 5, at 3.
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invalidate the sentence. 34 This distinction permits appellate courts to examine
indirectly and to overturn those sentences which they find excessive without
fear of contravening Supreme Court guidelines in this area.
A.

Albse of Discretion or Failure to
Exercise Discretion in Sentencing

In United States v. Waters, 35 a nineteen year old defendant pleaded guilty
to various counts of robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. Although the
offender moved for sentencing under FYCA, he was nevertheless sentenced as
an adult. However, the district court recommended that it be served in a
youth institution. 36 This recommendation was ignored, and defendant was
transferred to a penitentiary,
where he suffered severe injuries after an attack
37
by a fellow inmate.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the sentence.
The court held that the district court had abused its discretion in failing to
make an implicit or explicit finding that the defendant would not benefit from
FYCA treatment.3 8 A refusal by the lower court to utilize the preferred
sentencing procedure established by Congress, without furnishing adequate
reasons for this refusal, evidenced an abuse of discretion. 39 Although the
sentence imposed was within statutory limits, the judicial process employed
by the lower court was flawed. The appellate court could, therefore, properly
intervene.
In United States v. Riley, 40 a statutorily authorized presentence report 4'
urged the imposition of an adult sentence in large part because the local youth
center was overcrowded. 42 In vacating the adult sentence, the court of
34. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974); United States v. Hopkins, 531
F.2d 576, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974).
35. 437 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 725.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 726-27.
39. Id.at 727.
40. 481 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1970). Such a report may be authorized if the district court wishes to
acquire additional information about the defendant before sentencing. The court may order the
youth to be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for "observation and study" at a
Classification Center or agency. The Lorton Committee, composed of a parole officer, a clinical
psychologist and an administrator of the unit, evaluates the youth's background and produces a
"medical and psychological" profile of the offender. Id. § 5014. The Committee's ultimate
recommendation as to a youth's amenability to FYCA treatment is the most influential and
complete § 5010(e) document. This study must be presented to the Director of the Bureau and the
Youth Correction Division of the Board of Parole within thirty days. Id. The Division must
submit its findings and make its recommendations within sixty days of the authorization. Id. §
5010(e).
42. 481 F.2d at 1132. The report indicated that adult sentencing was recommended primarily
because of the overcrowded conditions at the local youth center. Such a reason was found to be
insufficient to support an adult sentence, because under the Act, the Attorney General may place
youth offenders anywhere in the United States. Id. Moreover, statistics indicated that only some
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appeals held that the acceptance by the district court of the recommendations
contained in the presentence report evidenced a failure by the court to exercise
its statutory duty. 43 Here again, the judicial process by which sentence was
imposed was scrutinized and found lacking since overcrowding at a local
yooth facility is not a cognizable reason for denying FYCA sentencing."
Therefore, the usual restrictions against appellate review were not applica45
ble.
In both Waters and Riley the appellate court made it clear that it was not
reviewing the sentence per se; rather, it was reviewing the process utilized by
the lower court in arriving at such a sentence. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, this latter step is merely a "necessary incident
of what has always
' 46
been appropriate appellate review of criminal cases.
In effect, an appellate court may properly scrutinize all the circumstances
which led the trial court to sentence as it did, but, once having carefully
scrutinized and become familiar with these facts, it may go no further. This
artificial "boundary" has been criticized by the ABA, which favors overt
47
appellate review of the sentences themselves.
B.

Mechanical Imposition of Sentences
In Williams v. New York, 48 the Supreme Court accepted the "prevalent
modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender
and not merely the crime. '49 In interpreting the Williams decision, appellate
courts have held that they have the power to vacate a sentence if it is imposed
"mechanically," i.e., without reference to the defendant's particular circum50
stances.
In United States v. Schwarz, 51 an eligible defendant52 was denied FYCA
sentencing in effect because of her privileged background. The trial court,
of the youth facilities within the United States were partly occupied. Id. at 1131 n.18.
43. Id. at 1132.
44. Under the statute, the chief reason for denying FYCA sentencing must be a belief that
rehabilitative treatment would not benefit the defendant. See notes 64-80 infra and accompanying
text.
45.
46.

481 F.2d at 1132 (Wright, J., concurring).
418 U.S. at 443, quoting United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1974).

47.

See note 14 supra.

48.

337 U.S. 241 (1949).

49. Id. at 247.
50. See United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiani); United States v.
Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974); cf.Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (Selective Service action; maximum sentence imposed without regard to defendant's
background or character); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971) (Selective
Service action; maximum sentence imposed on remand despite appellate court's admonition to
reconsider severity of sentence).
51. 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
52. Although defendant was twenty-five years old at the time of sentencing, she could have
been sentenced under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970). While recognizing that the district court
acted within the scope of its statutory discretion in refusing FYCA sentencing, the appellate court
disapproved of the manner of refusal. 500 F.2d at 1351.
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throughout the course of the trial and during the sentencing proceedings,
frequently made reference to the educational and cultural advantages which
defendant had enjoyed throughout her life. 53 The court's apparent bias
resulted in imposition of an adult sentence, despite the recommendation of
both the Government and the defense attorney that a FYCA sentence be
imposed.5 4 In vacating the adult sentence, the Second Circuit held that the
refusal of the trial court to make a specific finding of no benefit under the Act
before sentencing defendant as an adult, in conjunction with certain
statements which intimated that only certain classes of persons could be
considered for FYCA sentencing, violated the individualized sentencing requirement of Williams.55 Again, while the sentence imposed was statutorily
permissible, the process utilized to impose such a sentence was marred. The
imposition of a strict sentence, without a showing that the defendant could
not benefit from FYCA sentencing, indicated a desire by the district court to
ignore the preferred sentencing procedures altogether.5 6 Thus, the appellate
court could intervene without restricting the lower court's discretionary
powers.
As was often the case in FYCA situations before Dorszynski, reversal of a
sentence was predicated not only upon abuse of discretion by the trial court,
but also upon a failure to make a finding of no benefit. However, it appears
that the Second Circuit could have reversed the Schwarz sentence solely by
employing a Williams rationale. The lower court's statements evinced an
intention to make the punishment fit the crime, regardless of any special,
mitigating circumstances in the defendant's background which would justify
the imposition of a lesser sentence. Such action has been found to be an abuse
of discretion by appellate
courts in non-FYCA situations, most notably in
57
Selective Service cases.
Appellate courts have, as a general rule, declined to review sentences which
fall within the statutorily prescribed maximum. 58 In United States v.
Hartford,59 however, the Fifth Circuit vacated two such sentences because of
the manner in which they were imposed.
Hartford, an eligible defendant under the Act, pleaded guilty to possession
of a controlled substance. Under FYCA, he received a sentence of four years
imprisonment. Had he been sentenced under the narcotics statute, the
maximum penalty possible would have been one year imprisonment, a fine of
$5,000, or both. 60 Bowdoin, a first offender also eligible under the Act,
53. Id. at 1351 & n. 1.
54. Id. at 1351-52.
55. Id.
56. The facts indicated that this was defendant's first offense and that her background was
admittedly stable and financially secure. Id. at 1351. The combination of these factors could
indicate amenability to FYCA treatment.
57. See Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v.
Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971).
58. See note 5 supra.
59.

489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974).

60. Id. at 653. The defendant violated the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1970).

YOUTH SENTENCES

19761

received the maximum term possible under the narcotics statute: five years
imprisonment. 61 In reversing, the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court's
admitted determination to impose the maximum term possible, either under
the Act or the narcotics statute, was not a reasoned exercise of sentencing
discretion. 62 The trial court here had failed to utilize FYCA for the purpose
intended by Congress: rehabilitation and reorientation of a nascent criminal.
In Hartford's case, the Act was used punitively, contrary to the goals of the
legislature; in Bowdoin's case, the Act was ignored, even though the defendant's lack of a prior criminal record indicated that he could benefit from its
application. While deterrence is a valid reason for imposing a strict sentence, 63 the trial court may not choose among several statutes to find the
maximum sentence possible, especially in an area in which Congress has
emphasized rehabilitation rather than punishment. 64
C. "No Benefit" Requirement Under FYCA
By enacting FYCA, Congress made it clear that an adult sentence was to
be imposed only as a last resort, i.e., only if the trial court found that the
defendant would derive no benefit from FYCA treatment. A frequent ground
for appellate review of sentences in this area had been the failure of some
lower courts to make specific findings of no benefit under the Act before
imposing adult sentence.
In the years preceding Dorszynski, several circuit courts, interpreting the
legislative intent in enacting FYCA, reached different conclusions as to the
criteria a district court had to meet before imposing an adult sentence.
The Sixth Circuit, in Brooks v. United States, 65 held that an express
determination of no benefit, as well as a statement of reasons supporting the
decision, was required in FYCA situations. 66 In the court's opinion, this
added requirement was necessary if appellate courts were to properly exercise
their responsibility to determine "whether the sentencing court has abused the
' 67
discretion conferred upon it by the Act."
61.

Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).

62.

489 F.2d at 655.

63. In United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1974). defendants, each sentenced to
three years imprisonment for distributing cocaine, claimed that the trial court's reason for
imposing such long sentences was a desire to rid the community of drug traffickers. The
defendants claimed that this violated the individualized sentencing requirements established by*
law. Id. at 525-27. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by considering general deterrence as a factor. The trial court's desire to look beyond the
offender to the sentence's presumed effect upon others was not contrary to the statute as long as
the trial court considers the circumstances of the particular defendant. Id. at 527.28.
64. One of the prime reasons for promulgating this preferred sentencing procedure for
youthful offenders was Congress' belief that by "herding youth with maturity, the novice with the
sophisticate . . .and by subjecting youth offenders to the evil influences of older criminals and
their teaching of criminal techniques . . . many of our penal institutions actively spread the
infection of crime and foster, rather than check, it." House Report, supra note 2, at 398565. 497 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1974) (on basis of Dorszynski
decision).
66. 497 F.2d at 1062.
67. Id. at 1063. See United States v. Ward, 454 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 19711 (per curiam),
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Similarly, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Kaylor,68 and the District
of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Reed 69 and United States v.
Coefield, 70 held that only an explicit finding of no benefit with supporting
reasons would justify imposition of an adult sentence. 7 1 Placing on the record
the factors which led the district court to sentence the defendant as an adult
would aid the appellate court in determining whether such factors7 2were
rationally related to the congressional objectives in enacting FYCA.
Several circuit courts imposed less stringent requirements in FYCA situations.
In Cox v. United States, 73 the district court judge imposed an adult
sentence on an eligible offender after expressly determining that the legislative
history of FYCA did not require a specific finding of no benefit. 74 The Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that "the language of the statute is plain. The
Youth Corrections Act must be used unless the sentencing judge finds that
treatment under the Act would not be beneficial." 75s However, if such a
determination were made and this could be gleaned from the record, no
76
explicit finding was required.
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Dorszynski,7 7 and the Third
Circuit, in Williams v. United States, 78 stated that an implicit finding of no
benefit was sufficient to satisfy congressional directives in this area. 79 The
Williams court, while noting that an explicit finding was desirable, expressly
refused to follow the standard established by the Coefield court.80
This conflict between the circuits as to the administration of the Act was
resolved by the Supreme Court in Dorszynski v. United States.8 '
In Dorszynski, an eligible defendant was indicted for selling LSD to an FBI
agent. After a plea of guilty was entered, but before sentence was imposed,
the defendant's attorney requested that his client be placed on probation,
according to the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a). Instead, the district court
where the appellate court held that the failure by the district court to find either implicitly or
explicitly whether the defendant would benefit from the Act prevented it from exercising its
supervisory powers to determine whether the judicial process utilized in sentencing was deficient.
Id.at 995.
68. 491 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated sub nom. United States v. Hopkins, 418 U.S.
909 (1974).
69. 476
70. 476
71. 491
72. 476
73. 473

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

74. The trial
given no greater
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 484 F.2d
78. 476 F.2d
79. 484 F.2d
80. 476 F.2d
81.

1145 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
1152 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
at 1138-39; 476 F.2d at 1150; 476 F.2d at 1156-57.
at 1150.
334 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973).

judge believed that FYCA was merely another sentencing alternative, to be
deference than any other statutory provision. Id. at 337.

849 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
970 (3d Cir. 1973).
at 851; 476 F.2d at 971-72.
at 972.

418 U.S, 424 (1974).
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sentenced the defendant as an adult.8 2 At no time during the sentencing
procedure did the district court mention FYCA. On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the sentence was invalid because the court had not made an
express finding of no benefit before imposing adult sentence. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that the imposition of the adult sentence itself
implied rejection of the Act.8 3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an
express finding of no benefit was required before a youth offender could be
sentenced as an adult.8 4 Once such a finding has been8 S made, however, the
sentencing court need not supply supporting reasons.
As for appellate review of sentences, the Court reiterated the traditional
view that "once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set
forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an
end."'8 6 The Court did not, however, restrict the appellate court's power to
scrutinize the judicial process 8 utilized
in imposing sentence, to ensure that
7
discretion has been exercised.
82. "Petitioner [the defendant] then received a split sentence which remitted him to the
custody of the Attorney General for one year, to serve 90 days' confinement 'in a jail-type or
treatment' institution . . . the execution of the remainder of the sentence was suspended and
petitioner was placed on probation for two years upon release from custody." Id. at 429.
83. 484 F.2d at 851.
84. 418 U.S. at 443-44.
85. 418 U.S. at 441-42. This ruling reversed the standard established in FYCA situations by
various appellate courts. See notes 65-80 supra and accompanying text. While concurring with
the majority that an explicit finding of no benefit was necessary in FYCA situations, Justice
Marshall, joined by three others, said that furthering the purpose of the Act requires a trial court
to supply supporting reasons when sentencing a youthful offender as an adult. In his view, merely
requiring a trial court to state that it has considered the Act and rejected it "renders the finding
requirement of § 5010(d) a nullity." Id. at 452. Recognizing the deep concern which led Congress
to establish such an extensive sentencing structure for youthful offenders, Marshall would require
"that the trial judge include, on the record, a statement which makes clear that he considered the
provisions of the Act, weighed the treatment option available, and decided in light of his
familiarity with the offender that he would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act." Id.
at 452-53. Rejecting the majority's view that appellate review is the only purpose to be served by
a statement of reasons, the concurring Justices enunciated other considerations requiring supporting statements. Forcing a trial court to articulate reasons for sentencing may aid in developing a
set of principles on which to base its sentencing decisions. These reasons in turn could aid
correctional authorities in determining the type of treatment to administer to the youth. Finally,
disclosing such reasons may aid the defendant's attorney in insuring that the sentence was not
based on misinformation or inaccuracies in the material relied upon by the judge in sentencing.
Id. at 455. The concurring Justices also seemed to feel that a declaration of reasons would
dissipate any feeling on the part of the offender that the sentence was arbitrary. Id. at 456.
86. Id. at 431.
87. Id. at 443, quoting United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1974). Even
this mild endorsement of appellate review, however limited, may be viewed with hostility by
some judges. Trial courts have generally been allowed to introduce new procedures themselves.
When suggested reform includes curtailment of sentencing freedom, and therefore a curtailment
of judicial freedom, trial courts view these proposals as particularly offensive. Robin, supra note
12, at 212.
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To the dismay of some commentators,
the Dorszynski ruling has revitalized the rule of no review. However, it has not completely halted
appellate attempts to review sentences.
IV.

APPELLATE REVIEW OF

SENTENCES AFTER

FYCA

Dorszynski

One area in which Dorszynski has clearly blocked appellate attempts to
review sentences has been in those jurisdictions which required a specific
statement of reasons for imposing adult sentences. 8 9 Attempts by defendants
to seek review because of the district court's failure to supply supporting
reasons have been rejected. 90 However, FYCA sentences may still be reviewed in certain circumstances.
A. Constitutional Violations in Sentencing
In United States v. Rogers, 91 an eligible defendant convicted of a narcotics
violation was denied FYCA sentencing because he refused to expose his
co-conspirators. 92 In sentencing the defendant as an adult, the district court
indicated that it would impose a FYCA sentence if the defendant would
waive his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 93 In reversing, the
Fifth Circuit held that the lower court had penalized the defendant because he
was exercising his constitutionally guaranteed rights. 94 Again, the sentence
itself was not invalid; rather, the judicial process by which the court imposed
the sentence was constitutionally deficient.
In United States v. Maples, 95 two defendants, a male and a female, were
denied FYCA sentencing. The male was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment while his female companion was sentenced to ten years. The district
court imposed a heavier sentence on the male because he believed that
88. See Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of
Appellate Review, 53 Neb. L. Rev. 463 (1974). The authors believe that Dorszynski will have a
"chilling effect" upon any efforts by appellate courts to revitalize the concept of review of
sentences. Id. at 515. Despite their unhappiness with the decision, they believe it will finally force
Congress to move on the issue. Id.
89. See notes 65-72 supra and accompanying text; see note 90 infra.
90. In United States v. Allen, 510 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a defendant was sentenced as
an adult after the district court had made the requisite finding of no benefit. On appeal, the
defendant claimed that the lower court's failure to specify why the defendant would not benefit
from FYCA treatment violated the circuit rules established in Coefield. The court of appeals held
that the Dorszynski ruling, requiring no such reasons, overruled the circuit view and thus negated
the defendant's contention. Id. at 652.
91. 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
92. Id. at 1084.
93. The trial court had stated that "the first step towards rehabilitation, in its opinion, was
to cooperate with the authorities in bringing others involved in the conspiracy to justice, and
unless and until Rogers indicated 'substantial, material, productive cooperation' the court would
not consider a lesser sentence." Id.
94. Id.at 1084-85.
95. 501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974).
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"[o]rdinarily . . . the man takes the lead and persuades the female, the
woman." 9 6 In remanding for resentencing, the Fourth Circuit disclaimed any
right to exercise "general appellate review over sentences.""7 The court
believed it could intervene here, however, because the sentences imposed
were in violation of the defendant's "constitutional or statutory rights." 98
The use of sex as a major factor in imposing disparate sentences for the same
crime was unconstitutional. 9
In both the Rogers and Maples cases, district court judges utilized impermissible standards in exercising their sentencing discretion, i.e., sex and the
failure to waive a constitutional right. As a result, the appellate courts,
exercising their supervisory power, were duty-bound to review and reverse
the lower court sentence.
B.

Abuse of Discretion

Several circuit courts have also continued to vacate sentences because the
district court either abused or failed to exercise sentencing discretion.
In United States v. Ortiz, 0 0° an eligible youth offender was convicted of
conspiracy to distribute marijuana and the substantive crime of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. On the conspiracy count the district court
imposed a FYCA sentence, while on the substantive count the court imposed
an adult sentence, to be served consecutively with the FYCA sentence. 0 The
Ninth Circuit, sua sponte, vacated the adult sentence. The court held that the
imposition of a FYCA sentence indicated that the defendant would derive
benefit from treatment. An adult sentence imposed on the substantive crime
was inconsistent with this view, and as such was an abuse of discretion.102
In United States v. Dancy,10 3 an eligible youth offender was sentenced as
an adult for the crime of first degree murder, receiving a sentence of twenty
years to life imprisonment. The district court, in sentencing, relied in large
part upon a pre-sentence report of the Classification Commitee, recommending the lowest possible adult sentence.' 0 4 The Committee did not know,
however, that the district court had no discretion to impose a short sentence
in this case; by statute, a first degree murder,defendant received a mandatory
minimum sentence of twenty years. 0 5- The report relied upon by the district
court was based upon a misconception. In vacating, the District of Columbia
96. Id. at 986.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
100. 513 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S 843 (1975).
I01. Id. at 199.
102. The appellate court here merely vacated the adult sentence, while affirming the decision
in all other respects. Id.
103. 510 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
104. Id. at 786; see note 41 supra.
105. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted of first degree
murder ... shall be eligible for parole only after the expiration of twenty years from the date he
commences to serve his sentence." 22 D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 2404 (1967).
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Circuit held that this reliance upon an unreliable report invalidated the
sentence. 10 6 The reasoned, calm exercise of discretion which is expected of a
district court judge was absent here.
In United States v. Hopkins, 107 an eligible defendant pleaded guilty to
manslaughter. Requesting a pre-sentence report, the district court received
conflicting appraisals of the defendant's amenability to treatment. The
Classification Committee at the local youth center recommended FYCA
sentencing;' 0 8 the Board of Parole recommended adult sentencing, primarily
because the superintendent of the youth center conditioned his recommendation for FYCA sentencing upon the youth's transferrence to a federal facility.' ° 9 At sentencing, the trial court, noting the conflicting reports as well as
defendant's prior record, sentenced Hopkins as an adult."10
In vacating, the court of appeals found the sentencing procedure flawed in
two respects: the trial court had failed to make an express finding of no
benefit;'' and the information relied upon by the court did not allow the
2
"knowledgeable sentencing called for by . . . FYCA."1
The failure by the district court to make an express no benefit finding
before sentencing Hopkins as an adult indicated that the court had not
"focused on amenability to treatment in making its sentencing determina11 3
tion."
In scrutinizing the " 'judicialprocess by which the particular punishment
was determined,' 114 the court found the documents relied upon in sentencing fatally flawed."s The totality of the information relied upon by the lower
court, in large part consisting of conclusory, inconsistent statements, denied
the lower court the "type of information to which he is entitled under the
Act-information that would enable him to make a knowledgeable sentencing
6
determination." 1
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Supreme Court in Dorszynski has halted any serious
attempts to expand the role of appellate courts in reviewing criminal sen106. 510 F.2d at 786. The court stressed that while recommending an adult sentence, the
Classification Committee's clinical psychologist expressed concern that Dancy would not receive
the " 'psychotherapy, vocational training and additional education' " he needed in an adult
institution. Id.
107. 531 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
108. For the makeup of the Classification Committee, see id. at 577 n.3.
109. The superintendent believed that Hopkins needed long term treatment, unavailable at
the local youth center. Id. at 577-78.
110. Id. at 578.
111. Id. at 579.
112. Id. at 580.
113. Id. at 579.

114. Id.at 580, quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974).
115. While acknowledging that Dorszynski restricted appellate review of FYCA sentences,
the court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court affirmatively approved of appellate courts
assuring themselves that information relied upon by the district court in sentencing was reliable
and accurate. Id. at 579-80.
116. Id.at 582.
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tences.1 7 Rejecting the recommendations of the ABA and various commentators, 118 it has affirmed 1once
again the virtually unfettered discretion of the
19
trial court in sentencing.
However, the Court emphasized the distinction between review of the
sentence itself and review of the manner in which it is imposed, and expressly
authorized appellate courts to scrutinize the judicial process utilized by the
trial court in arriving at such a sentence.' 20 This approach has been used
frequently by appellate courts as justification for vacating excessive or harsh
sentences.121

It is submitted that any reform of the criminal justice system must include
appellate review of sentences. The traditional reason for rejecting such
review, the ability of the trial court to study the demeanor and character of
the defendant, is no longer controlling. In the vast majority of cases, guilt is
not at issue, as the defendant has admitted committing the crime. 122 The trial
court, then, need concern itself only with the imposition of sentence, one
which will satisfy the needs of justice and the particular circumstances of the
defendant. Despite the importance of the court's decision, the time allocated
to sentencing-reviewing the pre-sentence report, conferring with the probation officer and arriving at a sentence-has been estimated to consume about
thirty minutes.' 23 Refusing to allow appellate review of sentences imposed in
such a manner cannot help but destroy confidence and respect for the law.'12
Until the Court expressly adopts the position advocated by most commentators, 25 appellate courts will be forced to devise means of reviewing
sentences which they believe to be excessive. It is not an overstatement to say
that this complete freedom, placed in the hands of one man, the trial judge, is
a condition which "[n]o other country in the free world permits . . . to

exist-'

26

It is to be hoped that this condition will not endure much longer.
Catherine A. Foddai

117.

See generally Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the

Concept of Appellate Review, 53 Neb. L. Rev. 463 (1974).
118. See notes 5, 14 & 32 supra.
119. See Robin, note 12 supra.
120. See notes 6 & 87 supra and accompanying text.
121.
122.
123.

See note 14 supra; see notes 91-116 supra and accompanying text.
ABA Draft, supra note 5, at 1.
Robin, supra note 12, at 210 and n.22.

124.
125.

ABA Draft, supra note 5, at 2.
See generally Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the

Concept of Appellate Review,

53 Neb. L.

Rev. 463 (1974);

Tydings, Ensuring Rational

Sentences--The Case for Appellate Review, 53 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 63 (1969); ABA Draft, supra
note 5.
126. ABA Draft, supra note 5, at 2.

